The 737 Max was touted as the next generation of a tried-and-tested workhorse of consumer aviation. However, two fatal crashes involving the plane within five months of each other, which killed a combined 346 people. As one of the world’s largest aerospace company and leading manufacturer, Boeing gets turned into a sales company, which focus on profits rather than safety.
Since the second crash in March, 2019, the plane has been grounded around the world. It’s not just the safety features that need to be repaired. The investigations have raised questions about whether the pilots had enough training when they moved from an earlier version of the 737 to the Max. Many 737 pilots were not required to undergo intensive training in flight simulators — instead doing so on iPads. Until the Lion Air crash, many 737 MAX pilots were unaware the MCAS system existed.
Is there a larger issue regarding safety assessments for planes? Some experts are saying “yes.” In part due to a lack of funding, the FAA has given airplane manufacturers more authority in conducting their own safety tests and approving new aircraft design. The Seattle Times reported that FAA “managers pushed its engineers to delegate wide responsibility for assessing the safety of the 737 MAX to Boeing itself. But safety engineers familiar with the documents shared details that show the analysis included crucial flaws.”
Department of Transportation Office of Inspector General (OIG) released the report “Timeline of Activities Leading to The Certification of Boeing 737 MAX 8 Aircraft and Actions Taken After the October 2018 Lion Air Accident” on June 29, which providing comprehensive, detailed timeline related to the certification and post-Lion Air accident activities of the Boeing 737 MAX 8. Throughout 2015, FAA and Boeing’s ODA unit members continued certification activities for the 737 MAX. Boeing also began revising MCAS based on the results of aircraft analyses and testing. However, MCAS was still not a major focus of FAA’s certification efforts, which continued to emphasise areas such as the aircraft’s new larger engines, fly-by-wire spoilers, and changes to the landing gear.
Boeing Completes Failure Analysis and Continues To Revise MCAS Flight testing of the 737 MAX began in 2016. Boeing completes the first Single and Multiple Failure document on the 737 MAX. Boeing uses the document to “prevent simultaneous failure from a single threat event which causes loss of continued safe flight and landing.” Boeing considered this failure probability analysis an internal document only and did not submit it as a required certification deliverable. Therefore, Boeing did not provide it to FAA, nor did FAA have to review or approve it as part of the certification process. However, according to FAA, some aspects of Boeing’s analysis from the Single and Multiple Failure document should be included in system safety assessments later provided to the Agency as certification deliverables.
Despite identifying this failure case and deeming it catastrophic, Boeing determined this failure case was acceptable because the probability of occurrence was determined to be extremely remote, and it was assumed the crew would recognise the situation and take appropriate action. While this failure test case may not be exactly the same as the circumstances encountered in the Lion and Ethiopian Air accidents, erroneous AOA data—potentially caused by the failure of one AOA sensor—was a factor present in both accident scenarios.
In order to gain more market profits, Boeing did not conduct a thorough and professional pilot training, transparent recertification process as well as software censorship. Instead of being one company producing safe aircrafts, Boeing hurries to push less than great products out the door just for the sake of more money. Quantity over quality, profits over safety, now it is destroying people’s lives.
(Syndicated content)
